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ABSTRACT 
Even though both “good governance” and “pro-poor growth” have become 
important concepts in development thinking and practice, studies that assess to 
which extent and how good governance contributes to pro-poor growth are still 
relatively scarce. After reviewing the two concepts, this paper develops a 
conceptual framework that specifies the linkages between different aspects of 
governance and pro-poor growth. Using this framework, the paper reviews a range 
of quantitative cross-country studies that include measures of governance as 
independent variables and focuses on the dependent variable in at least two of the 
three dimensions of pro-poor growth: poverty, inequality, and growth. The review 
shows that governance indicators that capture a sound decision-making 
environment for investment and policy implementation, such as political stability 
and rule of law, are associated with growth but provide mixed results in regard to 
poverty reduction. On the other hand, governance indicators that refer to transparent 
political systems, such as civil liberties and political freedom, tend to be conducive 
for poverty reduction, but the evidence is rather mixed, and the relationship of these 
variables with growth remains unclear. The paper discusses the methodological 
challenges inherent in this literature and suggests areas for future research. 
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"Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in 
eradicating poverty and promoting development."  





Since the 1990s, the concept of “good governance” has taken center stage in 
development thinking and practice. This is reflected not only by Kofi Annan’s statement 
above but also by donors’ increasing dependence on governance performance indicators 
for allocating overseas development assistance (ODA).
3 Several reasons account for the 
increasing attention to governance and institutions by the international development 
community, among them research findings demonstrating that the effectiveness of 
financial aid depends on “a good policy environment” (Burnside and Dollar 1997; World 
Bank 1998: 2).
4  According to Wolfensohn and Bourguignon (2004), the lackluster 
performance of structural adjustment programs, the end of the Cold War and the funding 
of proxy states, political problems associated with reforming the economy of the former 
Soviet Union, and institutional weaknesses revealed during the East Asian financial crisis 
have also contributed to the new focus on governance.    
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While good governance is increasingly viewed as a key ingredient for 
development, the 1990s also witnessed a renewed focus on poverty reduction as the 
major goal of development. The first of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
clearly places reducing poverty and hunger at the top of the international agenda. Poverty 
had already been a major focus of development in the 1970s, highlighted in the 1973 
Nairobi speech by former World Bank President Robert McNamara, but the 1980s were 
dominated by a focus on structural adjustment policies aimed at promoting growth.  More 
recently, there has been broad consensus in the development community that growth 
must be accompanied by redistributive policies in order to eliminate poverty.  While this 
thinking was popularized in the 1970s as “redistribution with growth” (Chenery et al., 
1974), a new term encompassing this idea became popular at the end of the 1990s: pro-
poor growth. Promoting pro-poor growth has now become a major goal in the strategies 
of international donor organizations.
5  
Since both governance and pro-poor growth are high on the development policy 
agenda, the question arises as to whether and how they are related to each other. While it 
is commonly assumed that good governance promotes pro-poor growth (World Bank 
2001), testing this assumption empirically is challenging for several reasons. First, there 
is no consensus on how to define and measure governance and pro-poor growth. 
Secondly, since growth and income distribution are influenced by many factors, it is not 
easy to isolate the influence of governance. Thirdly, the direction of causality is far from 
clear.  In fact, the link between economic growth and democracy, typically considered as 
one dimension of governance, has puzzled economists and political scientists for decades. 
(see Bardhan 1999, for a review).  Fourth, while there is a considerable body of literature 
on the relationship between governance and growth, there are still relatively few cross-
country studies that link governance indicators with the joint outcomes of growth, 
                                                 
5 See, for example, the websites of DFID (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/propoorbriefnote2.pdf),  
GTZ (http://www.gtz.de/de/themen/wirtschaft-beschaeftigung/6642.htm), and  
OECD (http://www.oecd.org/document/62/0,2340,en_2649_34621_31549822_1_1_1_1,00.html).   7
inequality, and poverty reduction, which together underlie the concept of pro-poor 
growth.
6  
Considering how strongly both concepts feature on the international development 
agenda and influence ODA allocations, it is troubling that there is not a more 
comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms linking governance and pro-poor 
growth.  As such, the objective of the present paper is twofold.  First, a conceptual 
framework is presented that identifies the possible linkages and feedback effects between 
governance and pro-poor growth.  Secondly, the available cross-country literature dealing 
with these linkages is discussed from both a methodological and an analytical 
perspective.  Based on the assessment of the findings from this literature, areas for further 
research are proposed.   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
attempts to define and measure governance and pro-poor growth, while Section 3 
presents the conceptual framework.  Section 4 reviews the available cross-country studies 
based on this framework.  The limits of these studies and areas for further research are 
discussed in Section 5.  Section 6 presents conclusions. 
 
                                                 
6An impressive annotated bibliography compiled by the World Bank (1998) highlights at least 50 empirical 
studies on the impact of governance on economic growth.  This bibliography can be accessed from the 
following website:  http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/annotedbibliography.pdf   8
II.  DEFINING AND MEASURING GOVERNANCE AND  
PRO-POOR GROWTH 
Governance 
Although governance is an oft-used term in international development, there are 
numerous interpretations of what the term actually describes.
7  For example, the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines governance as “... the exercise of 
economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all 
levels.  It comprises mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and 
groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and 
mediate their differences” (UNDP 1997).  The World Bank refers to governance as “ the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common 
good.  This includes the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and 
replaced, the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and 
implement sound policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them.”
8 Although such definitions appear 
neutral, they are implicitly based on normative assumptions, such as that those in 
authority should be monitored.  Of course, definitions of “good governance” explicitly 
have a normative content, identifying what the organization or author proposing the 
definition considers desirable.  Citizen participation, accountability, transparency, rule of 
law and stability are common elements in many definitions of good governance.  Some 
definitions of good governance go beyond these components and include the adoption of 
specific policies, such as policies promoting private-sector led growth, as elements of 
good governance.
9 A distinction has to be made between (1)  identifying governance 
                                                 
7 The authors refer here to the concept of governance as used in the development literature and discourse. 
The concept was originally used by specialists in medieval English society, which was characterized by 
cooperation between the different sources of power (church, nobility, merchants, peasants, etc.). The term 
has also been widely used by scholars in economics and in the social and political sciences who study 
coordination mechanisms. For example, Williamson’s (1985) transaction costs approach deals with 
governance structures, and Ostrom (1990) refers to “Governing the Commons.”  
8 World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/about.html#approach. 
9 See, for example, the definition of “good governance” presented by AusAid, the development 
organization of the Australian Government at http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/simons/chp13.pdf.   9
elements that are instrumental to reach other goals, such as poverty reduction, and (2) 
defining governance elements that constitute values in their own right.  To quote an 
obvious example, democracy is widely considered a goal in its own right, but the case of 
China shows that it is not a necessary condition to reduce poverty.
10  In this paper, the 
authors attempt to analyze how and to which extent different dimensions of governance 
defined in the literature (either as goals in their own right or as instrumental) can 
influence pro-poor growth.  
The definitional ambiguity surrounding the notion of governance is particularly 
challenging when trying to measure governance.  Governance-related donor and research 
initiatives have been accompanied by a surge in indicators that aim to measure 
governance.  The World Bank Institute’s Governance website lists approximately 130 
datasets attempting to quantitatively capture various aspects of the concept.  These 
datasets include indicators that measure not only familiar aspects of governance, such as 
corruption and human rights violations, but also more specific issues, including the 
degree of decentralization, labor rights, gender equality, and press freedom.  The 
following sections review three of the most commonly-used data sets in the cross-country 
research on governance.  
Aggregate Governance Indicators Dataset (World Bank) 
Considered the most comprehensive dataset on governance, the dataset developed 
by World Bank researchers Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and colleagues, hereafter 
called the KK Dataset, is based on governance measures from different data sources, 
including Freedom House’s civil liberties and political rights indices, and the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), both of which are described in detail below. 
                                                                                                                                                 
AusAid claims that there is a “widespread agreement among donors” on some of the essential elements of 
good governance. The document lists the “need for responsible fiscal and economic policies which 
encourage open and efficient trading systems and private sector-led growth” as one such element. (p. 224). 
The World Bank’s CPIA criteria also include a range of structural and social policies.  
10 For a comprehensive review of theories and case studies on democracy, “good governance,” and 
development, see Potter (2000).   
   10
Datasets are available for the periods 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004.  The number of 
measures and data sources used to construct this dataset has increased over time.  The 
2004 dataset covers 209 countries and territories, and the indicators are based on several 
hundred individual variables, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 
different organizations (Kaufmann et al., 2005).  The KK Dataset tries to capture three 
dimensions of governance: (1) “the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored, and replaced; (2) capacity of government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of the citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern the economic and social interactions among them” (Kaufmann et 
al. 2003).  An unobserved components model is used to reduce the 250 measures into six 
indicators that correspond to these dimensions.   
The indicator voice and accountability refers to whether citizens participate in the 
selection and monitoring of their governments while the political stability indicator 
captures  whether the government is vulnerable to change through violent or 
unconstitutional means.  Both indicators fall under the first dimension of governance.  
Government effectiveness and regulatory quality both belong to the second dimension.  
Government effectiveness examines the capacity of civil servants, the quality of public 
service provision, and the credibility of government commitment to policies.  Regulatory 
quality focuses on whether the policies promoted are “market-friendly” in the areas of 
trade and business.  The final dimension of governance includes rule of law and control 
of corruption.  Rule of law includes the enforcement of property rights and the 
predictability of rules governing social and economic interactions.  Lastly, control of 
corruption refers to whether there is evidence of the “exercise of public power for private 
gain” in the business environment and in the broader political arena.   
Although the KK Dataset is one of the most widely used in cross-country 
research, and has been employed by the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) to 
determine country eligibility for funds, it is not without its flaws.  For instance, the 
aggregation procedure results in indicators with wide margins of error (Hyden, Court, and 
Mease 2002).  In addition, countries may change over time because of increased data   11
availability rather than any substantive changes within that country.  While Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) believe that these problems are not very significant, they 
encourage caution when using the indicators to make cross-country comparisons.  
 The Freedom House Dataset 
Since 1972, Freedom House has produced Freedom in the World Ratings, which 
reflect the combined score of a political rights and civil liberties index.  Also known as 
the Gastil indices after their creator, Raymond Gastil, Freedom House compiles these 
indices for 192 countries and 18 territories.  The political rights index attempts to capture 
the extent to which citizens can participate in the political process by competing for 
public office and exercising a right to vote, particularly for representatives who actually 
have a decisive vote on public policies.  The civil liberties index has a broader aim, 
namely, to measure whether citizens have sufficient freedom to develop opinions and 
personal autonomy without state interference.   
A number of Freedom House analysts determine the extent of political rights and 
civil liberties based on secondary materials, such as foreign and domestic news reports, 
scholarly analyses, and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) publications, as well as 
through visits to and communication with their contacts in each region.  The analysts then 
assign points from 0 to 4 for 10 questions related to political rights and 15 regarding civil 
liberties.  The points are translated into a rating system from 1 to 7, with a higher rating 
corresponding with a worse performance.  The separate ratings for political rights and 
civil liberties are then averaged to determine whether a country can be classified as Free, 
Partly Free, or Not Free.  However, in empirical research, the separate index ratings are 
usually retained, and  the civil liberties index is used more frequently than the one for 
political rights (Freedom House 2003).   
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Covering 140 countries from 1980 to the present, the ICRG is a product of the 
Political Risk Services (PRS) Group that analyzes and forecasts risk for international   12
investors.  According to the company’s website, the ICRG model helps determine how 
risk can affect the business and investments of  “institutional investors, banks, 
multinational corporations, importers, exporters, foreign exchange traders, shipping 
concerns, and a multitude of others” (PRS website).   
The ICRG contains 22 components that are grouped into three categories of risk:  
political, financial, and economic.  For all components in the three categories, higher 
points are assigned if the potential risk for that component is lower.  While the financial 
and economic assessments are based on objective data, using variables such as foreign 
debt as a percentage of GDP and exchange rate stability, political risk assessments are 
performed subjectively by the ICRG’s editors.  In determining the composite rating, 
political risk contributes 50 percent to the rating while the other two categories contribute 
25 percent each.  
The ICRG, the Freedom House indices, and the KK dataset have proven to be the 
most popular source of governance indicators for cross-country econometricians.  Yet, as 
discussed in section 5.1, they are all based on subjective perceptions of government 
performance, or outcomes, than on objective understandings of government processes.  
As such, it is difficult to determine what governance inputs are required to facilitate pro-
poor growth, which in turn creates ambiguity with regards to interpreting the collective 
policy implications of these studies for the broader development community.   
Pro-Poor Growth 
Like governance, the term “pro-poor growth” is relatively new but the concept 
very much reflects the notion of “redistribution with growth” popularized by Chenery et 
al. (1974) in a joint World Bank/IDS publication with the same name.  Both the earlier 
and more recent re-formulation affirm the primacy of growth in reducing poverty while 
also acknowledging that inequality can prevent growth from being pro-poor.  In other 
words, there are two main channels by which growth becomes pro-poor: either growth 
occurs under situations where very little inequality exists or inequality diminishes even if   13
growth is stagnant.  Obviously, a combination of increased growth and reduced inequality 
would also lead to pro-poor outcomes.     
Although organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (2001) and the UN (2000) have employed a very broad definition 
by classifying it as growth that benefits the poor, most technical conceptualizations of 
pro-growth fall into either one of two categories:  relative and absolute.  The relative 
category emphasizes that pro-poor growth occurs when economic growth 
disproportionately  benefits the poor and highlights that achieving pro-poor growth 
requires ameliorating inequality (Cord et al. 2003).  One approach for capturing pro-poor 
growth is measuring whether the per capita income growth rate of the poor surpasses the 
average income growth rate (Klasen 2001).  The poverty bias of growth (PBG) measure 
used by McCulloch and Baulch (1999) subtracts the real change in the poverty headcount 
between two time periods from the predicted change if there was an equal distribution of 
income.  If PBG is positive, then pro-poor growth occurred.  Kakwani and Pernia (2000) 
also developed a pro-poor growth index based on taking the poverty elasticity with 
respect to per capita income as a ratio of the poverty elasticity with respect to per capita 
income, assuming no change in income distribution.   
Others, however, argue that growth is pro-poor if the poor benefit in absolute 
terms, as reflected by a chosen measure of poverty.  More specifically, the rate of growth 
and the way in which it is distributed both determine the rate of change in poverty and 
reveal the degree to which growth is pro-poor.  A well-known measure of pro-poor 
growth that adheres to this definition is the mean growth rate of the income of the poor 
(Ravallion and Chen 2003).  Thus, the main difference between these two definitions is 
that, while the former emphasizes that the poor must benefit more from growth than the 
nonpoor, the latter assumes that growth is always pro-poor unless the incomes of the poor 
decline or stagnate.  The cross-country studies included in this review span both the 
relative and absolute approaches.   14
III.  LINKAGES BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND PRO-POOR GROWTH:  
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Figure 1 displays a conceptual framework that attempts to identify the linkages 
and mechanisms through which governance interacts with pro-poor growth.
11  In line 
with the literature on economic growth, the framework distinguishes between initial 
conditions, drivers, and outcomes.  The outcome relevant to this paper, pro-poor growth, 
is represented by Box H.  
Achieving pro-poor growth partially depends on the policies (Box F) a country 
adopts, including policies related to trade, investment, social protection, and 
redistribution.  The impact of these policies on pro-poor growth is influenced by their 
implementation  (Arrow G).  Policy choice is often considered an aspect of “good 
governance.”  However, determining which policies promote pro-poor growth, depending 
on a country’s circumstances, remains an empirical question.  Policy recommendations 
that are frequently advocated in the pro-poor growth literature include creating a stable 
macroeconomic environment, stimulating growth in the agricultural sector, integrating 
backward areas, reducing asset inequality, and improving human capital (Bigsten and 
Shimeles 2004; Dorward et al. 2004; Klasen 2001;  Lopez 2004a).  
Many of the policy recommendations, however, are embedded in an apolitical 
framework.  The framework proposed here acknowledges that policies are outcomes of a 
political process (Arrow D), even though this process remains a “black box” in most of 
the cross-country literature.  The political process is influenced both by the political 
system (Box C) and by the socioeconomic system (Box B).  Political system refers to a 
country’s political institutions, public administration, and judiciary.  Key political 
institutions that help distinguish amongst various political systems include the ability of 
citizens to elect representatives, the degree of competitiveness within the electoral 
system, the freedom of the media, and checks and balances between various branches of 
government.  These institutions determine the space for participation and debate in the 
                                                 
11 This framework is based on an approach developed jointly with IFPRI’s Country Strategy Team led by 
Xinshen Diao.   15
political process (link C-D) and influence the types of policies that a government selects 
and implements (link D-F-G).  
 
Figure 1.  Conceptual Framework 
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Indicators that capture a political system’s degree of openness and participation include 
the civil liberties and political freedom indices by Freedom House and the voice and 
accountability index in the KK Dataset.  Importantly, these indicators are actually 
measuring governance outcomes, or performance. 
Along with a country’s socioeconomic conditions and policy choices, the political 
system influences the “decision-making environment” (Box E), which encompasses 
those governance indicators that are assumed to influence the decisions of economic 
agents, such as private investors.  The decision-making environment also influences the 
decisions of the different actors involved in implementing policies and programs, thus 
influencing the effectiveness of policy interventions (see arrow from Box E to Arrow I).  
Both the political stability and rule of law indices in the KK Dataset as well as the 
political risk component of the ICRG capture elements of the decision-making 
environment.  Specifically, these indices examine crime levels, vulnerability to coups, 
ethnic and religious tensions, protection of property rights, corruption, and quality of the 
bureaucracy.  The governance indicators constituting the decision-making environment 
may also influence the political processes (link E-D).  For example, if the poor lack 
confidence in the state’s ability to meet their needs, they may refrain from engaging in 
the political process (Moore and Putzel 1999).  
The socioeconomic system (Box B) captures some of the initial conditions that 
are important with regard to stimulating growth and determining the poor’s access to 
growth opportunities.  They include demographic characteristics, economic institutions, 
the stage of development at the starting point of the period under consideration, and 
socio-cultural institutions.  The socioeconomic system influences growth and poverty 
outcomes directly (link B-H) as well as indirectly via the political system and the 
decision-making environment (links B-C, B-E and C-E).  These links acknowledge that 
governance performance (an outcome variable) is influenced by the interaction between 
the political institutions, civil society actors, and the private sector.  For instance, citizen 
engagement is necessary to make democratic institutions function effectively.  In an 
ethnically divided society, stability may be more difficult to achieve.  Whether rule of   17
law exists depends not only on the judiciary system, but also on the degree to which 
citizens are willing to obey laws and regulations voluntarily, which in turn may depend 
on the legitimacy of the government.  Likewise, the socioeconomic system obviously has 
a strong influence on the political processes (link B-D) and the policies to which they 
lead. 
Finally, a country’s natural conditions ( Box A) play an important role for 
growth and poverty outcomes.  They include natural resources (e.g., whether a country 
has minerals and oil), agroecological conditions, and other geographic conditions, such as 
a country’s size and whether it possesses a coastline.  The influence of natural conditions 
on governance is widely documented.  For example, the “resource curse” theory suggests 
that richness in natural resources biases the political process in such a way that the 
outcomes with regard to pro-poor growth are unsatisfactory.
12  This would suggest a line 
of causality from A to E, D, F, G and finally H.  
Admittedly, many more factors could be incorporated into this framework, 
including the role of external factors such as the international trading environment.   
Nevertheless, the present framework incorporates many of the variables considered 
within the pro-poor growth literature without becoming unwieldy.  Moreover, this 
framework highlights the feedback effects between these variables and pro-poor growth.  
Significantly then, this framework emphasizes that the relationship between governance 
and pro-poor growth not only manifests itself through multiple channels but also is 
nonlinear and dynamic.  
 
                                                 
12 For examples, see Auty and Gelb (2001), Karl (1997), and Moore (2004).    18
IV.  WHAT DO CROSS-COUNTRY STUDIES TELL US REGARDING  
THE LINKAGES BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND PRO-POOR GROWTH? 
The framework described above guides the review of cross-country empirical 
studies that focus on at least two of the three dimensions of pro-poor growth:  poverty, 
inequality, and growth.  Moreover, the chosen studies include governance indicators that 
correspond to the decision-making environment (Box E) and political system (Box C) as 
presented in the framework above.  While some of the studies also examine the 
relationship between policies (Box F) and pro-poor growth, the authors only provide a 
brief review of the country study findings in this area.  Cross-country studies examining 
the interaction between the political process (Box D) and pro-poor growth are notably 
absent from this literature.  A more detailed description of the selected studies can be 
found in Table A.1 of the Appendix.     
Decision-Making Environment 
A number of cross-country studies examine the link between the decision-making 
environment and pro-poor growth (E-H in Figure 1).  Based on a sample of 92 countries, 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate econometrically 
whether the policies and institutions traditionally associated with growth also have an 
impact on poverty.  To account for possible endogeneity, they average each of their 
explanatory variables over the five-year time span preceding the period of their growth 
data.  As a result of this approach, they find that the rule of law indicator from the KK 
dataset is positively and significantly correlated with growth in average per capita 
incomes and positively but insignificantly related to growth in per capita incomes of the 
poorest quintile.  They conclude that while greater rule of law may be associated with a 
greater share of growth accruing to the poorest 20 percent of the population, this is 
predominantly due to the indicator’s influence through growth rather than through 
improving distribution.  These findings are partially reinforced by Kraay (2004) in which 
he uses univariate regressions and a sample of 58 countries to understand the relationship 
between a set of explanatory variables and their individual effects on growth in average   19
incomes, changes in the Gini coefficient, and changes in poverty for four different 
poverty measures.
13  Kraay argues that univariate rather than multivariate regressions are 
more appropriate considering the level of measurement error for his dependent variables.  
Yet, he also notes that his approach could obscure unobserved country-specific 
characteristics.  Notwithstanding this caveat, this method reveals that rule of law is 
positively correlated with the growth component of poverty changes but also significantly 
with poverty-increasing shifts in relative incomes, leading Kraay to conclude surprisingly 
that “poverty-increasing distributional change is more likely to occur in countries with 
better institutional quality” (p.25). Nevertheless, the association with the growth 
component is larger, leading to net reductions in the poverty headcount.  Similarly, Lopez 
(2004b) finds that the distribution of income could actually be exacerbated when the 
decision-making environment is less vulnerable to risk.  Based on growth and inequality 
panel data for 41 countries and using a two-step generalized methods of moments 
(GMM) estimator, he discovers that a better rating on the ICRG index is associated with 
greater inequality.  
This contradicts Chong and Gradstein (2004) who examine the impact of political 
institutions on income inequality for 121 industrial and developing countries.  While they 
recognize the endogeneity inherent within this relationship, they reject using an 
instrumental variables approach to control for this problem.  Instead, they use vector 
autoregressions on a set of panel data, which allow them to explore how the behavior of 
their independent variables affects the future behavior of their dependent ones.  As a 
result of this method, they discover that the political stability and the rule of law 
indicators from the KK dataset, as well as the ICRG index, all exhibit a negative and 
significant relationship with inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient.  In other 
words, better governance indicators lead to a decrease in inequality.  When they examine 
the reverse relationship, Chong and Gradstein find that inequality negatively impacts 
these governance variables, as well. 
                                                 
13 Poverty is measured according to four different indicators:  the headcount poverty rate (P0), depth of 
poverty (P1), the poverty gap (P2), and the Watts index.     20
Studies that included dependent variables focused on poverty or broad measures 
of development likewise yield contradictory results.  The econometric analysis by 
Arimah (2004) uses a linear functional form and an OLS estimation technique to examine 
the relationship between governance and poverty for a sample of 30 African countries.  
He finds that the political stability indicator from the KK dataset has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on reducing the percentage of the population below the 
national poverty line.  Yet, he provides no explanation for this surprising result nor does 
he justify why he uses poverty data that precedes the time period of his governance data 
poverty data.  His study contradicts Dollar and Kraay (2002) who lagged their 
governance variables.  Nevertheless, Arimah’s (2004) findings are echoed in a study by 
Moore et al. (1999) that also uses an OLS technique to uncover which political variables 
are most effective in converting income into human development.  In order to achieve 
this, the authors constructed for 61 developing countries a relative income conversion 
efficiency (RICE) index, which captures variations in the education and health 
components of a country’s Human Development Index (HDI)
14  Unlike Arimah, Moore 
et al. adjust for endogeneity by averaging their explanatory variables over the 1980s and 
constructing their RICE index for 1995.  Consequently, they find that greater 
performance on the ICRG index is actually correlated with a worse score on the RICE 
index.  
On the other hand, Dollar and Kraay (2002) find that rule of law has a positive, 
albeit insignificant, relationship with the growth of the incomes of the poorest 20 percent 
of the population.  Likewise, Christiaensen et al. (2003) focus on poverty dynamics 
during the 1990s in a small sample of African countries and discover that an 
improvement in the political component of the ICRG index was generally accompanied 
by reductions in the headcount poverty.  For countries where political risk declined but 
                                                 
14 The HDI is calculated annually by the United Nation’s Development Program.  There are three elements 
of the HDI:  life expectancy at birth; a combination of the adult literacy rate and the gross school 
enrollment ratios at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels; and GDP per capita in purchasing power 
parity USD.  After removing the GDP per capita element, Moore et al. (1999) calculated the difference 
between the actual level of the HDI and the level one would predict for a country based on its income per 
capita.  The RICE index represents this difference.     21
poverty increased, including Madagascar, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, the authors 
speculate that other events, including macroeconomic instability and environmental 
shocks, played a larger role.  This study is notable for rejecting formal econometrics and 
rather employing simple bivariate correlations, which is understandable given the small 
size of the authors’ sample set.   
Collectively analyzing these disparate studies reveals that the rule of law indicator 
may have little impact on a more equitable income distribution but impact poverty 
reduction by stimulating growth.  The political risk component of the ICRG index 
appears to provide few conclusive results.  Indeed, it is associated with greater income 
inequality and lower human development outcomes but appears to be correlated with 
poverty reduction in a few African countries.  These inconclusive and contradictory 
results probably reflect the inappropriate use of the ICRG index for analyzing poverty 
impacts.  Indeed, confirming a concern mentioned in Section 2, it might indicate that the 
political factors that attract foreign investors are not necessarily indicative of a decision-
making environment that actively includes the poor in the growth process (Moore et al 
1999).  Lastly, the finding that greater political stability is associated with higher poverty 
reflects the lack of adequate theory linking this variable with poverty outcomes (linkages 
C-E and E-D-F-G-H).  An unstable political environment certainly reduces confidence 
and the credibility of government policy commitments.  On the other hand, long-ruling, 
autocratic regimes can create political stability but may lack a developmental vision that 
promotes the interests of the poor.  Indeed, this highlights that one shortcoming of the 
governance indicators included in these studies is that they do not capture the political 
orientation of the governments in power. 
Political System 
As postulated in the conceptual framework of Figure 1, the decision-making 
environment prevailing in a particular country is shaped by a country’s political system 
(Box C).  Empirical research has shown that growth is associated with a wide range of 
political systems (Alesina and Perotti 1994; Moore and Putzel 1999; Potter 2002) but it is   22
not clear that the same is true with regard to poverty reduction.  Achieving pro-poor 
outcomes often depends on whether the poor can effectively organize to influence policy 
(Klasen 2002).  Notwithstanding the difficulties of collective action caused by 
information asymmetries and geographic isolation, the opportunity for the poor to 
actively influence policy is severely circumscribed under closed regimes that limit 
political participation and competition.  Open and competitive political environments 
may not only empower the poor on their own behalf but also reduce inequality by 
diminishing the ability of the rich to lobby exclusively for policies in their own favor (Li 
et al. 1998; White and Anderson 2001).   
As indicated above, governance indicators that refer to a political system’s degree 
of openness and participation include the civil liberties and political freedom indices by 
Freedom House and the voice and accountability index of the KK Dataset.  The empirical 
results show that the choice of indicator as an independent variable matters, especially 
since the results are less consistent using the Freedom House indices than they are using 
the World Bank index.  Specifically, Li et al. (1998) use a sample of 49 countries 
spanning the period from 1947 to 1994 and employ an OLS estimation to examine the 
relationship between the civil liberties index and various dependent variables capturing 
inequality, including the Gini coefficient, the real income of the top quintile of the 
population, and the real income of the bottom 80 percent of the population.  They 
discover that improvements in civil liberties are positively and significantly associated 
with increases in the incomes of both the poor and the rich as well as a decrease in the 
Gini coefficient.  Their study suggests that a one standard deviation decrease in the civil 
liberties index could lead on average to a 0.77 percent increase in the poor’s income and 
a 0.40 percent increase in the rich’s income.
15  Similarly, Chong and Gradstein (2004) 
note that improved performance on the civil liberties and political freedoms index, as 
well as a simple average of the two, yields a significant and negative correlation with the 
Gini coefficient.  
                                                 
15 As noted in the discussion on indicators in Section 2, the civil liberties and political freedom indices are 
constructed in such a manner that a higher score actually implies worse performance.     23
However, these two studies are contradicted by White and Anderson (2001), who 
analyze 143 growth episodes to determine which variables have the greatest impact on 
the share of incremental income received by the poorest 20 and 40 percent of the 
population as well as changes in their share of income.  Because their dependent 
variables are expressed as first differences, they attempt to reduce multicollinearity by 
expressing all of their explanatory variables, including civil liberties and political 
freedoms, as first differences as well.  They discover that an improvement in civil 
liberties over time actually demonstrates a negative and statistically significant 
correlation with the incomes received by the poor.  In fact, a one standard deviation 
decrease in the civil liberties index results in a 0.13 percent decrease in the share of 
incremental income received by the poorest 40 percent of the population.  On the other 
hand, they also find that a negative change that results in the deterioration of political 
freedoms is significantly correlated with a decrease in the share of income that accrues to 
the poor.  The authors claim that this disparity may be because civil liberties provide a 
voice for well-organized interest groups while political freedoms are advantageous to a 
broader group of individuals.  However, this explanation is not very satisfactory 
considering that greater examination of the variables that constitute the civil liberties and 
political freedom indices does not suggest this.
16  Even more confusingly, they also find 
that civil liberties are positively associated with growth while political freedoms are 
negatively associated with it.  Yet, neither governance variable is statistically significant 
in these growth regressions.  
In order to assess the joint determinants of growth and inequality, Lundberg and 
Squire (2003) examine a sample of 125 countries and use both the GDP per capita in 
1985 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and the Gini coefficient as their dependent 
variables.  In order to reduce reverse causality between a number of their policy variables 
and the dependent variables, as well as to correct for correlations with omitted 
                                                 
16 Indeed, the political freedoms index is comprised of the following components:  electoral process, 
political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government.  The civil liberties components are:  
freedom of expression and belief, assocational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy 
and individual rights (Freedom House 2003).     24
characteristics, the authors rely on a three-stage least squares (3SLS) technique and 
incorporate a number of instrumental variables.  Regardless of this different approach, 
they support the finding of Li et al. (1998) that a better rating in the civil liberties index is 
positively and, significantly, associated with a reduction in the Gini coefficient.   
However, they contradict White and Anderson (2001) by showing that greater civil 
liberties are negatively, and in their case significantly, correlated with growth in per 
capita incomes.  In particular, a one standard deviation decrease in the civil liberties 
index leads to a 0.56 percent decrease in the growth of per capita incomes.   
Freedom House’s civil liberties and the political freedom indices, along with 
indicators from six other sources are integrated into the voice and accountability index of 
the KK Dataset.  Research by Dollar and Kraay (2002) shows that the voice and 
accountability indicator is positively correlated with income growth amongst the poorest 
quintile of the population.  While the relationship is significant at the ten percent level, 
the magnitude of the coefficient is quite small, such that a unit increase in a country’s 
voice and accountability indicator will lead on average to a 0.095 percent increase in the 
poor’s incomes.  Likewise, in Arimah (2004), voice and accountability is negatively 
correlated with the percent of the population living below the national poverty line and is 
significant to the one percent level.  When examining poverty spells, Kraay (2004) found 
that the voice and accountability indicator is positively correlated with the growth 
component of the poverty changes but also positively correlated with the poverty-
increasing distributional component.  Neither correlation, however, is statistically 
significant.   
Altogether, these studies suggest that a more open political system is pro-poor in 
terms of increasing incomes and reducing the poverty headcount.  Yet, they are less clear 
about what the intervening mechanism is, i.e. increased growth, improved equity, or a 
combination of both, that leads to such outcomes.     25
Policies and Strategies  
In the framework proposed here (see Figure 1), development policies and 
strategies are considered to be conceptually different from governance.  However, as 
mentioned in Section 2.1, the adoption of “sound” policies is often considered an element 
of good governance, especially by donor organizations.
17  Against this background, it 
appears useful to briefly review what the studies examined in this paper found regarding 
the impact of different policies on pro-poor growth.  The authors concentrate on two 
major policy areas often considered to be related to good governance: macroeconomics 
and trade policies, and the provision of public goods.   
Macroeconomics and Trade: 
Macroeconomic stability is already widely accepted as a crucial component of 
pro-poor growth (Klasen 2001).  For instance, both Lundberg and Squire (2003) as well 
as Lopez (2004b) show that lower inflation is negatively and significantly correlated with 
the Gini coefficient while positively and significantly correlated with growth.  Thus, by 
increasing growth and reducing inequality, low inflation would presumably also be pro-
poor.  Dollar and Kraay (2002) confirm this assumption by showing that higher inflation 
is associated with a lower share of income that accrues to the poor, although the 
relationship is not significant.  Using a broader measure of macroeconomic stability, 
namely, an index that combines fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies, 
Christiaensen  et al. (2003) find that the poverty headcount decreased in the African 
countries in their sample that experienced an improvement in this macroeconomic policy 
index.        
The results are more ambiguous regarding trade openness.  In Dollar and Kraay 
(2002), trade openness, measured as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, is 
correlated with growth and appears to be poverty-reducing.  Using the same measure, 
Kraay (2004) observes that trade openness is associated with reduced poverty through 
both its growth and distribution components.  Yet, using the Sachs-Warner index, which 
                                                 
17 See footnote 9.   26
captures a country’s exchange rate, tariffs, and nontariffs barriers, Lundberg and Squire 
(2003) find that trade openness is positively and significantly related to both growth and 
the Gini coefficient.  This implication of a potential trade-off between growth and 
inequality is also supported by Lopez (2004b) who measures trade openness as the 
volume of trade adjusted by a country’s size and population and according to whether it 
is landlocked and an oil exporter.  Although these conflicting results are probably due to 
the use of different trade openness measures, they may also reflect that the impact of 
trade openness on the poor may vary according to the sectors in which the poor are 
concentrated.  Moreover, some portions of the population better adjust during the process 
of trade openness.  As such, examining the relationship between trade openness and 
inequality over the short and long terms could add more insight about the dynamics of 
this variable.  Lopez (2004b) did exactly this and found that while trade openness appears 
to increase poverty in the short run, it is negatively correlated with poverty in the long 
run.      
Provision of Public Goods: 
Public goods can play an important role for promoting growth and reducing 
poverty, but their provision may also involve trade-offs with regard to growth and 
poverty reduction.  The studies included in this review focus on two elements of public 
goods provision:  the impact of overall government spending as well as the benefits from 
the actual public goods.    
Total government spending appears to be uniformly antigrowth in the three 
studies in which it was examined but, the impact on the poor is less clear.  For Dollar and 
Kraay (2000), total government consumption is negatively associated at a statistically 
significant level with both growth and with growth in incomes of the poor.  Interestingly, 
while Kraay (2004) also found a negative correlation between government consumption 
and growth, his study unveiled that government consumption appears to improve 
distribution in a manner that reduces poverty.  This echoes Lopez (2004b) where 
reductions in government spending correlate positively with income growth but   27
negatively with inequality.  These results are significant to the 1 percent level.  Thus, it 
appears that high levels of government spending diminish growth but also shift the 
income distribution in a manner that is more pro-poor.     
Obviously, the relationship between government spending, growth, inequality, 
and poverty depends on how the resources are actually allocated.  Aggregating all 
government consumption together prevents a comprehensive understanding of which 
areas have the greatest pro-poor potential.  Unfortunately, only two studies actually 
focused specifically on social expenditures and arrived at very different results.  While 
Arimah (2004) finds that expenditures on health and education are positively correlated 
with reductions in poverty, Dollar and Kraay (2000) uncover a negative association 
between these expenditures and the income growth of the poor.  They argue that this 
finding may indicate that the rich and middle class are more likely to benefit from these 
expenditures and, therefore, the share of public spending devoted to social sectors does 
not accurately capture whether a government is pro-poor.  
On the other hand, a key area for social expenditures, education, has been 
extensively studied with uniformly positive results.  Both Arimah (2004) and Dollar and 
Kraay (2000) observe a positive correlation between primary schooling and poverty 
reduction, although the correlation is only significant in the former study.  Nevertheless, 
Dollar and Kraay (2000) do note a positive and significant correlation between the 
number of years of secondary schooling per worker and growth.  Measuring human 
capital as a log of gross secondary school enrollment, Lopez (2004b) finds the same 
results with growth as well as a positive and statistically significant relationship with 
reduced income inequality.  Likewise, Lundberg and Squire (2003) discover that the 
number of years of schooling is negatively and significantly correlated with inequality.   
Summary  
Examining the admittedly scant cross-country literature linking governance with 
pro-poor growth reveals some contradictory and even counterintuitive findings.  Tables 1 
and 2 synthesize the findings from the cross-country studies about the relationship   28
between pro-poor growth and those governance variables capturing the “decision-making 
environment” and the “political system.”  The pluses indicate that improvements in the 
respective governance variable will impact the corresponding measure of pro-poor 
growth in a favorable manner.  For instance, one study (Chong and Gradstein, 2004) 
found that greater political stability is associated with a lower Gini coefficient, which is a 
positive outcome and, therefore, represented with a plus sign.  On the other hand, since 
one study (Arimah, 2004) found that greater political stability actually leads to a larger 
share of the population below the national poverty line, a negative sign is used to indicate 
this negative outcome.  Asterisks signify that the relationship was statistically significant.  
Multiple plus or minus signs in one particular box indicates that more than one study 
examined the relationship between that particular governance indicator and the 
corresponding pro-poor growth measures.  As the tables show, few studies used the same 
measures of both governance and pro-poor growth.  Moreover, there are many empty 
cells in these tables, which emphasizes that the relationship between governance and pro-
poor growth has yet to be explored along these dimensions.   
With regard to policies and strategies, the picture is only slightly clearer.   
According to the findings described above, only macroeconomic stability and education 
policies appear to promote simultaneously growth, equity, and poverty reduction.  Trade 
openness may increase growth but at the expense of greater equality.  On the other hand, 
government spending may contribute to greater equality but also reduce growth and 
increase poverty.       
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Table 1.  Synthesis of Findings between Variables Describing the Decision-Making 
Environment and Pro-Poor Growth Measures 








Growth    + 
*    + 
* 
+ 
RICE   -- 
*  
Population below national poverty line  -- 
*    
Population on less than 1USD per day  +    
Human Poverty Index  +    
Incomes of the poorest 20%     -- 
Distribution component of change in the 
poverty headcount     -- 
Ratio of top to bottom quintiles  + 
*  + 
*  
Income share of the middle quintile   + 
*  + 
*  
Gini Coefficient  + 
*  + 
*  
Change in the Gini coefficient      -- 
Change in log of Gini coefficient 
   -- 
*  
Notes:  
a The results presented indicate have been adjusted to assume that a greater value on the ICRG 
Index is equivalent to greater performance.  Asterisks signify that the relationship uncovered was 
statistically significant.  
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Table 2.  Synthesis of Findings between Political System Variables and Pro-Poor 
Growth Measures 
Independent Variables  Components of Pro-Poor 















Growth  +    -- 
*    
Population below national 
poverty line    + 
*        
Population on less than 
1USD per day  --      
Human Poverty Index  +      
Incomes of the poorest 20% 
of the population    + 
*   + 
*    
Change in share of income 
for poorest 20%        + 
Change in share of income 
for poorest 40%     -- 
*    + 
* 
Distribution component of 
change in the poverty 
headcount 
--      
Share of incremental 
income received by the 
poorest 40%  
   -- 
*  + + 
* 
Share of incremental 
income received by poorest 
20% of the population  
       + 
Incomes of the richest 80%     + 
*    
Ratio of top to bottom 
quintiles    + 
*     
Income share of the middle 
quintile    + 
*      
Gini Coefficient    + 





Change in the Gini 
coefficient   --      
Notes:  a The results presented have been adjusted to assume that a greater value on the Gastil, Civil 
Liberties, and Political Freedom Indices is equivalent to greater performance.   
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V. DISCUSSION   
This review highlights that, despite the general assumption that good governance 
promotes pro-poor growth, there is relatively little evidence from cross-country research 
unequivocally confirming the linkages between these two concepts.  This is not to deny 
that such a link exists but rather to identify the challenges faced by cross-country studies 
in understanding how  these vaguely-defined concepts are linked.  Below, the 
methodological challenges in these studies are addressed and recommendations for 
further research in this area are presented.   
Methodological Challenges 
Problems of Comparison 
Econometric studies typically suffer from biases created by omitted variables, the 
ubiquitous problem of endogeneity, and time lags between changes in governance and 
changes in income and poverty.  Poverty dynamics not only are influenced by a number 
of factors that lie outside the realm of governance but also impact the decision-making 
environment and the political system.  As the framework presented in Figure 1 suggests, 
the decision-making environment, political system, and policies/strategies may also be 
highly correlated with each other.  Moreover, the lack of adequate theory linking 
governance with pro-poor growth precludes determining the proper functional form that 
regression analyses should adopt.  As described above, the studies reviewed here use 
different econometric methods (see also Table A.2 in the Annex for a summary).  While 
it is to be expected that various econometric techniques are used to meet the 
methodological challenges inherent in cross-country studies, this contributes to the 
difficulties in comparing the findings of these studies. 
The challenges of comparison are further compounded by other methodological 
differences.  The impact of governance on pro-poor growth undoubtedly varies across 
countries and over time.  As Appendix 1 clarifies, the studies reviewed here range from 
including 42 countries to 193; from an Africa-only sample to samples that incorporate   32
only one African country; from a period of five years to one of fifty.  Moreover, no two 
studies use the same measurement for both governance and poverty or inequality, which 
more generally reflects the lack of consensus regarding how to define governance and 
pro-poor growth discussed in Section 2. 
Interpreting Governance Indicators 
Despite the many differences among the studies, they all exclusively incorporate 
subjective governance indicators that are derived from expert polls or surveys.  The 
benefits and disadvantages of subjective indicators, as opposed to objective ones, are 
critical because the choice of approach has significant implications for not only how 
governance is measured but also what  a governance indicator is actually capturing.   
Implicit within subjective indicators are normative assessments about the most preferable 
types of governance.  In some respects, this is a practical approach since for many 
dimensions of governance, only a few objective indicators are available for a small group 
of countries (Besançon 2003).  This is especially true for those dimensions of 
governance, such as corruption, that are characterized by their illegality and therefore 
purposely not quantified (Kaufmann 2002; Kaufmann et al., 2003).      
Subjective indicators may also better capture a government’s success at achieving 
certain outcomes since de facto and de jure performance may diverge significantly (Aron 
2000;  Kaufmann 2002).  Simply because a country has written laws protecting property 
rights does not necessarily mean that they are enforced in practice, nor does the existence 
of elections indicate a functioning democracy.  Moreover, objective measures may only 
capture a narrow element of government performance without providing a broader 
understanding of governance (Kaufmann et al., 2003).   
However, in order to understand processes, which are related to the underlying 
factors and institutions that determine how  rather than what  outcomes are achieved, 
objective indicators may be preferable (Besançon 2003; Court, Hyden, and Mease 2002; 
Henisz 2001).  One advantage of objective indicators is that they offer practical 
implications for policy (Besançon 2003).  Indeed, while a subjective indicator may show   33
that a country demonstrates extreme policy volatility, an objective indicator could reveal 
that this is due to lack of checks and balances between various branches of government.  
Moreover, the choice and construction of objective governance indicators is often 
embedded in political and political economy theory, while subjective indicators may 
instead reflect the biases or client needs of the organizations that created them (Besançon 
2003).  This can diminish their legitimacy among developing country governments, who 
can in turn blame their poor rankings on Western-imposed ideas of “good governance.” 
Objective indicators are also usually more transparently constructed and therefore 
more easily replicated (Knack and Kugler 2002).  It is difficult to replicate the 
construction of subjective indicators that are based on surveys since the respondents’ 
answers can vary according to their cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds (Court, 
Hyden, and Mease 2002).  With both surveys and polls, there is always the possibility 
that answers are influenced by recent changes in growth, highly publicized political 
events, or hysteresis, i.e. countries cannot escape past perceptions of their performance 
(Aron 2000).    
Lastly, subjective indicators are more amenable to aggregation than objective 
ones.  On the one hand, this helps reduce the impact of idiosyncratic factors and provides 
a more accurate view of governance within a country than each of its component 
variables (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2003).  Yet, as Keefer (2004a) notes, 
aggregation only makes sense “if all good things go together,” and in many cases, they do 
not.  From a policy standpoint, improving governance requires addressing each of its 
components separately and understanding which components deserve priority, a step that 
can be hindered by aggregation (Besançon 2003; Keefer 2004a).       
The problems caused by aggregating indicators are well reflected in this review.  
For instance, why does improving voice and accountability appear to increase the 
incomes of the poor?  And why do some studies find this is not the case when two 
components of the voice and accountability index, civil liberties and political freedom, 
are examined separately?  These ambiguities are often exacerbated by the mixture of 
inputs and outcomes in these indicators.  The ICRG’s political risk component, for   34
example, includes among other variables the extent of the military in politics, ethnic 
tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucratic quality.  All three variables 
influence each other, but by aggregating them together there is little understanding of 
where trade-offs exist among them. 
Areas for Further Research  
In spite of the methodological challenges inherent in such research, empirical 
work on the interaction between governance and pro-poor growth remains a worthwhile 
undertaking, particularly since donors often base policy decisions on the assumption that 
a relationship exists.  There are, however, opportunities to make such research more 
policy-relevant and to offer greater understanding of how these two concepts are related.   
Linking Political Systems and Policies 
The studies included in this review focus on how Boxes C, E, and F each 
separately affect pro-poor growth without examining their interaction with the political 
process (Box D).  Political processes implicitly are dynamic phenomena that are difficult 
to capture with static methods, but theory and cross-country research in political 
economy offers some preliminary ideas about how to understand the links between the 
political institutions and policy choices.   
For example, there is a growing literature on whether and how autocracies and 
democracies vary in regards to their spending on and provision of public goods.  Deacon 
(2002) claims that economic and political resources are more likely to be concentrated 
among a small elite in autocracies, and this elite will have few incentives to use their 
resources to fund public goods that benefit the broader populace.  Using data on 
autocracies and democracies from Polity IV, he finds that democracies tend to provide 
significantly more roads, schools, safe water, and sanitation facilities than autocracies.
18  
                                                 
18 Polity IV is a dataset compiled by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at 
the University of Maryland, College Park that assesses the extent to which a democracy is institutionalized.  
Based on historical, social science works, and national constitutions, Polity IV calculates indicators of 
democracy and autocracy on a 0 to 10 score where 10 indicates a high degree of that system and 0 a low 
degree.  By subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy 1, a polity score can be derived ranging   35
On the other hand, Keefer and Khemani (2003) note that while the median voter 
theorem would predict broad social service provision in democratic developing countries 
where a majority of the population is poor, the reality is much different.  They highlight 
three factors that explain this phenomenon:  information asymmetry among voters, 
identity-based voting caused by social fragmentation, and the difficulty of discerning the 
credibility of political promises to citizens.  Mulligan et al. (2004) substantiates these 
assumptions by also using the Polity IV database and analyzing panel data for 142 
countries divided between two periods, 1960-1974 and 1975-1990.  They find no 
difference between democracies and autocracies in relation to their total government 
consumption, education spending, and social spending, such as on pensions and social 
security programs.   
The heterogeneity among democracies, especially in regard to electoral 
institutions, might partially explain these divergent findings.  Based on panel data for 
approximately 61 countries between 1960 to 1998 and using social security and welfare 
spending as either a percentage of GDP or as a ratio to spending on goods and services, 
Persson (2002) finds that both presidential regimes and majoritarian electoral systems are 
correlated with lower government spending than parliamentary regimes and proportional 
electoral systems.  
Further political economy research that focuses on how to achieve the policies 
and strategies that have been shown to be pro-poor would offer important insights on 
governance processes.  This would also involve integrating into the cross-country 
research more objective indicators that, as noted above, capture process much better than 
subjective ones that assess performance.  One source of these indicators is the Database 
of Political Institutions, which contains for 177 countries 108 variables related to 
elections, election rules, the type of political system, level of military influence on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
from -10 to 10.  The dataset also examines the durability of the polity according to the number of years 
since the last transition as well as the regulation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment; 
the regulation and participation in the political system, and the level of constraints on the executive 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2002).  Currently, the Polity IV dataset covers 161 countries from 1800 to 2003.   
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government, measures of checks and balances, political stability, and composition of 
ruling and opposing government coalitions.  As such, it can assist with analyzing the 
political institutions conducive to development and the conditions under which such 
institutions emerge (Beck et al 2001).  
It is important to note, however, that political economy models also face 
limitations in terms of capturing the role that differences in education, ethnicity, religion, 
and culture, play in determining political processes.  Moreover, the power of ideas, such 
as political ideologies and public discourse, are not adequately captured in models 
focusing on political institutions.  In addition, incorporating political economy models on 
political systems and policy into cross-country analyses that ultimately aim to explain 
pro-poor growth will certainly pose even more methodological challenges than those 
highlighted above.   
Taking the Role of External Actors into Account 
Besides exploring political economy approaches to understand political processes, 
there is also scope for examining the diversity of actors influencing the political system.  
In particular, the studies reviewed here tend to focus on how governments alone should 
achieve pro-poor growth, and the subjective indicators they use are predominantly 
intended to assist donors in allocating resources to well-governed countries and to help 
investors avoid volatile portfolios.   
There is little examination of how external actors, such as donors and foreign 
investors, impact the behavior of national governments and, in turn, indirectly influence 
the opportunity for pro-poor outcomes.  Yet, there is growing evidence that they play a 
role.  For instance, Moore et al. (1999) show that foreign aid as a share of GNP reduces 
RICE, and Leonard and Strauss (2003) argue that foreign aid can contribute to the same 
negative effects often associated with enclave economies by reducing government’s 
accountability to their citizens.  Knack’s (1999) cross-country analysis likewise reveals 
that higher levels of foreign aid, even after controlling for income levels, erode the 
quality of political institutions.  Similarly, while the private sector can be adversely   37
affected by unpredictable decision-making environments and weak political institutions, 
it can also contribute to these problems (Kaufmann 2003).  Examining how the quality of 
governance is affected by external actors offers a fruitful area for future research and 
exploring how to make research on governance and pro-poor growth more relevant for 
policymakers in terms of identifying priority areas for intervention.   
Grouping Countries and Other Approaches 
Cross-country analyses that distinguish ex-ante among countries with similar 
characteristics and uncover priority areas that are specific to a country’s economic or 
political development level represent another avenue for potential research.  Indeed, 
Kaufmann (2003) highlights that the priorities for mature democracies will vary quite 
substantially from those that are quite young.  Grindle (2004) advocates examining the 
governance needs for achieving poverty reduction and growth by dividing developing 
countries into collapsed states, poor but stable countries, and emerging market 
economies.  Another approach to be considered to study the relationship between 
governance and pro-poor growth is to conduct analyses at the subnational level (cross-
region regressions).  This appears useful in large countries that display substantial 
variations in regional governance as well as growth and poverty outcomes.  China, India, 
Indonesia and Nigeria would be examples.  There is also a considerable potential to learn 
from pair-wise comparisons of countries.  Research on other issues showed that by 
comparing India and China, it was possible to gain insights that could not have been 
derived from either cross-country regressions or cross-region regressions in one country 
(Gulati et al., 2005). 
In addition, innovative approaches in econometrics could be incorporated to 
examine thresholds and nonlinearities in the development process and thereby help 
address sequencing issues.
19 
                                                 
19 Zhang (2004) offers a useful example of this approach.  Using household data from Uganda, Zhang 
found that there is a threshold level of security below which public investments in infrastructure and 
education have little impact on growth. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The concepts of governance and pro-poor growth in relation to developing 
countries are not necessarily new.  Indeed, during the early postcolonial period, numerous 
theories emerged about the relationship between political systems and economic growth, 
which continue to be debated and researched today.  Likewise, the notion of 
“redistribution with growth” in the 1970s highlighted that without ameliorating 
inequality, growth alone would only benefit a narrow segment of the population.  Various 
studies subsequently explored whether and how growth and inequality affect each other.   
Yet, these topics have recently reemerged in a more nuanced fashion.   
“Governance” is no longer confined to debates over democracy and authoritarianism but 
rather concerned with, among other things, the interaction between different stakeholders 
within the state, policy processes, and the evolution and maintenance of political 
institutions.  Hundreds of indicators, both subjective and objective, have emerged to 
capture these new conceptualizations.  Similarly, the pro-poor growth literature has 
helped focus attention on the importance and measurement of the growth-inequality-
poverty nexus as well as the distinction between relative and absolute notions of pro-poor 
growth.   
Despite the importance of governance and pro-poor growth on the current 
development agenda, however, there have been few attempts thus far to comprehensively 
explore their interactions with each other.  As a result, a majority of the pro-poor growth 
discourse remains embedded in an apolitical framework, focusing predominantly on 
which policies should be pursued rather than on the political institutions that best foster 
these policy outcomes.  On the other hand, the good governance literature does not 
adequately distinguish between which aspects of governance are conducive to growth and 
which determine whether the poor are capable of participating in the growth process.  As 
a result, Grindle (2004) notes that there is little understanding of what should be the 
governance priorities if poverty alleviation is the objective:  “Among the governance 
reforms that ‘must be done’ to encourage development and reduce poverty, there is little   39
guidance about what’s essential and what’s not, what should come first and what should 
follow, what can be achieved in the short term and what can only be achieved over the 
longer term, what is feasible and what is not” (p.526). 
This review examined a small sample of empirical studies that, while not 
exclusively focused on uncovering the relationship between governance and pro-poor 
growth, offer a number of important insights about the challenges of such an undertaking.  
In particular, countries are at different economic and political stages of development, and 
there is a lack of theory regarding the time lags and direction of causality between good 
governance and pro-poor growth.  Moreover, the lack of consensus over the definition 
and measurement of both governance and pro-poor growth precludes arriving at any 
concrete conclusions from a comparative analysis.  Indeed, the studies reviewed here 
often yielded counterintuitive and, when compared with each other, even contradictory 
results. 
The definitional ambiguity regarding governance is reflected in the choice of 
indicators (subjective versus objective, aggregated versus nonaggregated) used as 
explanatory variables and, in turn, affect the overall policy relevance of these studies.  
Specifically, by using aggregate indicators that capture governance outcomes, it is 
difficult to discern from these studies how such outcomes are achieved and which aspects 
of governance are most important.  Although they pose additional methodological 
challenges, political economy models that incorporate objective, process-oriented 
indicators are a promising approach for understanding how the political system affects 
policy choices and ultimately pro-poor growth.  Likewise, integrating more disaggregated 
indicators that focus on specific aspects of governance, such as freedom of the press or 
the form of democracy, would highlight which components of the good governance 
concept are most conducive to pro-poor growth.   
Ultimately, however, arriving at a more comprehensive understanding of the 
linkages between governance and pro-poor growth involves combining cross-country 
regressions with micro-level analyses, case studies, and historical narratives (Grindle 
2004;  Kraay 2004).  This is particularly important since the notion and relevance of good   40
governance varies according to the sociocultural and political contexts prevailing in a 
particular country or community.  Case studies can, in turn, inform the choice of structure 
and variables included in cross-country research.
20  Otherwise, “good governance” and 
“pro-poor growth” will remain donor buzzwords describing the goals of international 
development initiatives but whose relationship with each other is actually poorly 




                                                 
20 For example, David Laitin (2002) advocates the tripartite method in the subfield of comparative politics.  
This method uses formal theory and narratives to complement statistical analyses.    41
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APPENDIX 
  
Table A.1.  Cross-country Studies Examining Dimensions of Governance and Pro-poor Growth 
Source  Objective and Methodology  Main Findings  
1.   Arimah, Ben C.  2004.   
“Poverty  Reduction and Human 
Development in Africa,” Journal 
of Human Development, Vol. 5, 
No.3:  399-415. 
Analysis of how different variables commonly 
associated with promoting development impact 
poverty across approximately 33 African 
countries.  The dependent variable, poverty, is 
measured in three ways:  percent of population 
below the national poverty line, percent below the 
international poverty line, and the human poverty 
index.  The independent variables include 
expenditures on health and education, primary 
school enrollment, HIV/AIDS, economic growth, 
voice and accountability, and political stability.  
The social expenditures have a positive impact 
on reducing poverty levels, and this finding is 
significant for education expenditures.  
HIV/AIDS has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on reducing poverty levels.  
While voice and accountability has a positive 
and statistically significant impact on reducing 
poverty levels at the national level, political 
stability actually has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on reducing poverty levels at 
the national level.  The author attributes this 
counterintuitive result to the fact that there is 
high correlation between the political stability 
and voice and accountability indicators.   
2.  Chong, A. and M. Gradstein.  
2004.  “Inequality and 
Institutions,” Working Paper 
No.506, Inter-American 
Development Bank:  
Washington, DC.  
Using vector autoregressions in a panel setting, 
this study focuses on the linkages between political 
institutions and income inequality for 121 
countries.  Gini coefficients proxy for inequality 
while the six indicators in the KK dataset, the 
ICRG, civil liberties and political freedom indices, 
and country credit ratings are used to measure 
political institutions.   
Regardless of the measure of political institutions used, 
the authors discover that poor institutions and income 
inequality reinforce each other.  In fact, the impact of 
inequality on institutions is actually greater than the 
reverse direction of causality.   The political stability 
indicator from the KK dataset appears to play the largest 
role in both cases, i.e., it is the variable that has the 
largest influence on inequality and the one that 
deteriorates the most the more unequal the income.  
Moreover, the impact of income distribution on political 
institutions is greater in developing countries than in 
industrialized ones.    
3.  Christiaensen, L., Demery, L., 
and S. Paternostro.  2003.  
“Macro and Micro Perspectives 
of Growth and Poverty in 
Africa,” The World Bank 
Economic Review, Vol. 17, No.3:  
317-347. 
Combines macroeconomic and policy/ institutional 
data with household survey data from the 1990s 
for Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mauritania, 
Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to 
uncover correlations with poverty reduction.  The 
macroeconomic index draws on Bouton et al 1994 
and combines fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate 
They find that the poverty headcount (P0) decreased in 
countries that also experienced an improvement in their 
macroeconomic policy score.  The two exceptions are 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, which experienced an increase in 
poverty despite improvements in macro-policy and which 
might hint at the time-lag between implementing reforms 
and ensuring that they are not reversed.  They also find   47
Source  Objective and Methodology  Main Findings  
policies.  The policy/institutional data is based on 
the ICRG index.  
that P0 decreased in those countries that experienced an 
improvement in their political risk score.  For those that 
didn’t experience a P0 decrease despite improvements, 
other factors such as droughts played a role.  
4.  Dollar, D. and A. Kraay.  
2002.  “Growth is Good for the 
Poor,” Journal of Economic 
Growth, Vol. 7:  195-225.   
Using income and inequality data for 92 countries 
between 1950-1999, the authors examine the 
impact of growth in per capita incomes on the 
incomes of the poor, who are defined as the 
poorest 20% of the population (bottom quintile).  
They, then examine whether the policies and 
institutions associated with growth also have an 
impact on poverty.  Thus, they include inflation, 
government consumption, exports and imports 
relative to GDP, financial development, and rule of 
law as independent variables in bivariate 
regressions.  In order to determine whether certain 
policies considered pro-poor have a greater impact 
on the incomes of the poor, they also analyze 
bivariate relationships using primary education, 
agricultural productivity, total government 
consumption, social spending, and voice and 
accountability.  
There is a one-to-one relationship between the growth in 
mean incomes and the growth of poor incomes.  
Moreover, the policies and institutions that promote 
growth also benefit the poor.  Specifically, secondary 
education, financial development, and rule of law are all 
positively and significantly associated with growth while 
inflation and government consumption are negatively 
associated with growth, with only the latter statistically 
significant.  Among the variables traditionally associated 
with poverty reduction, primary education, agricultural 
productivity, and voice and accountability are positively 
associated with growth in the incomes of the poor, with 
only the latter statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Social spending and total government consumption are 
negatively associated with growth in incomes of the poor, 
with only the latter statistically significant at the 1% 
level.   
5.  Kraay, A.  2004.  “When is 
Growth Pro-Poor?  Cross-
Country Evidence.”  World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 
3225, Washington DC. 
Uses poverty surveys to look at short- and long-
term poverty spells that cover 58 countries.  He 
then proceeds with univariate regressions where 
the dependent variables are the distribution 
component of change in growth, the Gini, and in 
P0, P1, P2, and Watts poverty measures.  The 
independent variables include rule of law, CPIA, 
openness to international trade, inflation, the size 
of government, the ratio of M2 to GDP, voice and 
accountability, relative productivity in agriculture, 
and primary educational attainment.  
Between 60 and 95 percent of poverty changes are due to 
growth in average incomes.  In the short-term, however, 
changes in income distribution are relatively more 
important.   
         In the univariate regressions, most of the variables 
were insignificant.  Nevertheless, the general pattern is 
that rule of law as well as voice and accountability are 
both positively correlated with growth and with 
distributional changes (this means that they are correlated 
with poverty-increasing shifts in relative incomes).  
Openness to international trade has a positive correlation 
with growth and correlated with more poverty-reducing 
shifts in incomes. Government consumption is negatively 
correlated with growth and negatively correlated with 
distributional change (meaning more poverty-reducing).    48
Source  Objective and Methodology  Main Findings  
Relative productivity in agriculture is uncorrelated with 
growth but tends to be positively correlated with 
distributional change (i.e., more poverty-increasing).   
6.  Li, H., Squire, L., and H. Zou.  
1998.  “Explaining International 
and Intertemporal Variations in 
Income Inequality,” Economic 
Journal, Vol. 108: 26-43. 
This article’s objective is to examine factors that 
influence inequality.  The political economy 
literature emphasizes that the rich have the 
resources to lobby for policies that benefit 
themselves.  The capital imperfections literature 
stresses that credit constraints prevent the poor 
from making productive investments and 
exacerbate inequality.  Thus, using data for 49 
countries over the period from 1947 to 1994, the 
dependent variables are alternatively the Gini 
coefficient, the real income of the top quintile of 
the population, and the real income of the bottom 
80 percent of the population.  To examine the 
political economy argument, they use the civil 
liberties index and level of secondary schooling 
and for the capital imperfections argument, they 
use land inequality and financial market 
development as explanatory variables. 
Financial development is negatively related to income 
inequality, and land inequality is positively related to 
future income inequality.  Years of schooling and high 
levels of civil liberties are both negatively related to 
income inequality. All of these correlations are 
statistically significant. They confirm these findings with 
their alternative dependent variables.  Indeed, years of 
schooling, financial development, and improvements in 
civil liberties are positively and significantly correlated 
with the income of the rich.  Land inequality is not 
significant for the rich.  For the poor, years of schooling, 
improvements in civil liberties, and greater financial 
depth are also positively correlated with income.  
However, land inequality is negatively and significantly 
correlated with income.  Thus, for both rich and poor, 
years of school, civil liberties, and financial depth are 
associated with greater income growth and lower 
inequality.  Land inequality is associated with greater 
inequality, particularly since it reduces the incomes of the 
poor.      
7.  Lopez, J.H. 2004.  “Pro-
growth, pro-poor:  Is there a 
tradeoff?” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3378, 
World Bank:  Washington, DC. 
The goal of this paper is to assess whether policies 
that are pro-growth are also pro-poor.  Using 
growth and inequality panel data for 41 countries, 
the author examines differences in the impact on 
growth and changes in the Gini coefficient caused 
by the following independent variables:  human 
capital, financial development, government burden 
(log ratio of government consumption to GDP), 
infrastructure, the political risk component of the 
ICRG, trade openness, inflation rate, cyclical 
volatility, real exchange rate misalignment, 
banking crisis, and terms of trade changes.    
Human capital, infrastructure, and low inflation both 
promote growth and reduce inequality.  The ICRG 
however seems to increase inequality, which he 
speculates might be because once he controls for policies, 
the level of inequality is not related to the level of 
governance.  Financial development, trade openness, and 
reductions in government spending appear to lead to 
faster growth but also increase inequality.  Using growth-
poverty elasticities, he finds that while these three 
policies might not be poverty-reducing in the shortrun, 
they are in the longrun.  However, he claims that political 
economy constraints could prevent these three policies 
from staying in place long enough to reach that poverty-
reducing level.    49
Source  Objective and Methodology  Main Findings  
8.  Lundberg, M. and L. Squire.  
2003.  “The Simultaneous 
Evolution of Growth and 
Inequality,” The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 113:  326-344. 
The objective of this paper is to uncover joint 
determinants of growth and inequality.  Using data 
on inequality for 125 countries and on GDP per 
capita in 1985 PPP terms, they examine the impact 
of the following independent variables:  share of 
government consumption, trade openness (Sachs 
Warner index), years of schooling, civil liberties, 
land distribution, and an interaction term between 
land distribution and a dummy for developing 
countries.  They run a number of different 
regression forms, ranging from base, structural, 
and reduced-form models.   
In general, they find that improving land inequality, 
reducing inflation, and improving education are 
correlated with both higher growth and lower inequality.  
However, greater trade openness is correlated with higher 
growth and higher inequality.  On the other hand, 
increases in civil liberties are correlated with greater 
equality but lower growth.  
9.  Moore, M., Leavy, J., 
Houtzager, P., and H. White.  
1999.  “Polity Qualities:  How 
Governance Affects Poverty,” 
IDS Working Paper 99, 
University of Sussex:  Sussex, 
England.  
This paper examines which political variables are 
most effective in converting income into human 
development.  Using data for 61 developing 
countries over the period 1980-1995, the authors 
construct an index called RICE (relative income 
conversion efficiency), which represents  the 
difference between the actual level of the HDI 
(with GDP removed) and the level one would 
predict for a country on the basis of its income per 
capita  (with 1995 as the base year).  RICE was 
used as a dependent variable and it was regressed 
on five main independent variables:  population 
density, contribution of mining/quarry to GDP, 
ratio of aid to GNP, quality of government 
institutions (ICRG), and Africa-related dummies.  
  
They find that minerals as a share of GDP is negatively 
and significantly correlated with RICE.  Aid as a share of 
GNP was also negative and sometimes significant.  
Surprisingly, the higher quality of institutions scored 
according to ICRG correlated negatively with RICE.    
10.  White, H. and E. Anderson.  
2001.  “Growth versus 
Distribution:  Does the Pattern of 
Growth Matter?” Development 
Policy Review, vol. 19, no.3:  
267-289. 
Cross-country regressions for 143 growth episodes 
examine which variables impact changes in 
income inequality (based on shares of income and 
changes in shares of income).  Main explanatory 
variables included GDP per capita growth, Gini 
coefficient, civil liberties, political rights, ethnic 
fragmentation, annual inflation, and trade 
openness.   The authors also examine sectoral 
patterns of growth. 
The higher the initial Gini, the less the poor benefit from 
growth.  There are apparent trade-offs between growth 
and distribution.  More civil liberties tend to have a less 
pro-poor impact while more political freedom tends to 
have a more pro-poor impact.   Ethnic fragmentation 
appears to increase the poor’s participation in the growth 
process.  Agricultural growth tends to be less pro-poor 
while the opposite is true for growth in the service sector.   50
Table A.2.  Examining the Magnitude of Governance Variables on Dimensions of Pro-Poor Growth
1 





Population below national poverty line  -9.379  Yes 
Population on less than 1USD per day  9.12  No 
Voice and Accountability 
Human Poverty Index  -0.937  No 
Population below national poverty line  13.972  Yes  
Population on less than 1USD per day  -4.59  No 
1.Arimah 
(2004) 
OLS with a linear 
functional form; 
No techniques for 
endogeneity described  
Political Stability OLS with a 
linear function form; 
  Human Poverty Index  -0.347  No 
Political Stability  Gini coefficient  -0.08  Yes 
Rule of Law  Gini coefficient  -0.016  Yes 
ICRG Political Risk Index  Gini coefficient  -0.051  Yes 
Civil Liberties Index
2  Gini coefficient -0.01  Yes 




Political Freedom   Gini coefficient  -0.01  Yes 
Growth 0.18  Yes    Rule of Law 
Incomes of the poorest 20%  0.032  No 
3. Dollar and 
Kraay  (2002) 
OLS with a linear 
function form; 
Endogeneity addressed by 
averaging the explanatory 
variables  over a five-year 
time span for the period 
preceding their data for 
the dependent variables  
Voice and Accountability   Incomes of the poorest 20%  0.095  Yes 
Growth 0.012  No 
Change in Gini  0.002  No  
Rule of Law 
Distribution component of change in poverty headcount  0.016  No 
Growth 0.002  No 
Change in Gini  0.006  No 
4. Kraay 
(2004) 
Univariate regressions  
Voice and Accountability 
Distribution component of change in poverty headcount  0.003  No 
Gini coefficient  1.61  Yes 
Incomes of poorest 20%  -0.77  Yes 
5. Li, Squire, 
and Zou 
(1998) 
OLS with a linear 
functional form; 
Instrumental variables 
used to address 
endogeneity for other 
explanatory variables not 
addressed here, such as 
financial depth  
 
Civil Liberties Index  
(A higher index value 
indicates worse performance)  Incomes of richest 80%  -0.4  Yes   51





Growth 0.006  Yes  6. Lopez 
(2004) 
Two-step generalized 
methods of moments 
(GMM) estimator 
developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) to 
ensure that the error term 
is not correlated with the 
lagged dependent variable 
ICRG Political Risk Indicator 
(A higher index value 
indicates worse performance) 
Change in log of Gini coefficient  0.006  Yes 
Growth 0.567  Yes  7. Lundberg 
and Squire 
(2003) 
3 Stage Least Squares 
(3SLS) with a growth 
function to examine 
growth and a linear 




employed to account for 
endogeneity  
Civil Liberties Index  
(A higher index value 
indicates worse performance) 
Gini coefficient  1.3207  Yes 
8.  Moore et 
al (1999) 
OLS with a linear 
functional form; 
 
A time-lag is applied to 
the explanatory variables  
ICRG Political Risk Index (A 
higher index value indicates 
worse performance) 
RICE -0.02  Yes 
Change in share of income for poorest 40%  0.001  Yes  Civil Liberties 
(A higher index value 
indicates worse performance) 
Share of incremental income received by poorest 40% 
of pop  0.134 
Yes 
Political Freedom 
(A higher index value 
indicates worse performance) 
Share of incremental income received by poorest 40% 
of pop  -0.103 
No 
Change in share of income for poorest 40%  -0.006  Yes 
Change in share of income for poorest 20%  -0.002  No 
Share of incremental income received by poorest 40% 
of pop  -0.464 
Yes 
9. White and 
Anderson 
(2001) 
OLS with a first 
differences functional 
form 
Change in Political Freedom 
Share of incremental income received by poorest 20% 
of pop  -0.069 
No 
Notes:        
1 The study by Christiansen,  Demery, and Paternostro (2003) is excluded from this table since they did not employ econometrics but rather examined bivariate correlations and reviewed 
multivariate studies performed by others.
   2 Chong and Gradstein (2004) rescaled the civil liberties and political freedoms indices from Freedom House such that in their study, higher scores on these 
indices imply greater performance.         52
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